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CONTRACT’S ADAPTATION AND THE ONLINE BARGAIN
Nancy S. Kim*
The model of traditional contracts is that of two individuals
negotiating terms that are to each party’s advantage. This model
persists even though it no longer reflects the reality of consumer
contracts. This Article traces the evolution of modern day consumer
contracts and explains how courts have accommodated business needs
by distorting contract law. This Article argues that the doctrine of
consideration should be reconceptualized in light of new technologies
and changes in doctrinal application. It concludes that in order to
restore contract law’s legitimacy, courts must allocate the burdens of
technological and doctrinal changes in a more evenhanded manner.
One way to do this is to require that websites use their technical
advantage to enable the consumer to indicate bargaining.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Modern day mass consumer contracts are facing a crisis of
legitimacy. Increasingly, consumers are being asked to sign agreements
that businesses do not actually expect them to read. Such expansive
contracting threatens to undermine the seriousness with which
consumers treat their contractual obligations. The problem is more
acute online. 1
The modern day contracting environment is vastly different from that
contemplated by traditional contract doctrine. The model of traditional
contracts is that of two equally matched individuals negotiating terms. 2
This model persists even though it rarely, if ever, reflects modern day
consumer contracts. As mass production became possible with
industrialization, companies found it more convenient and efficient to
create standard terms for mass consumer transactions. 3
Courts
accommodated changing market realities by enforcing these standard
form contracts even though they were contracts of adhesion, and the
consumer could not negotiate terms. 4
Similarly, mass consumer software licenses evolved from a business
reality confronted by software companies. 5 Because their products
could be easily duplicated and transferred, software companies came up
with a novel way to get them to consumers—by licensing instead of
selling them. The license required a mass market contract, but one that
did not incur the transactional hassle of having the customer sign
anything. Instead, software companies simply tucked the license
alongside the compact disc containing the software and wrapped the
entire package in plastic wrap. Courts eventually recognized the
shrinkwrap license as a legitimate contract, 6 which paved the way for
courts to recognize the legitimacy of other innovative contracting forms,
such as the clickwrap (which the user assents to by clicking on an icon
indicating agreement) and the browsewrap (which is a hyperlink to a

1. See infra Part IV.
2. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 295–96 (3d ed. 1999) (“Traditional contract law was
designed for a paradigmatic agreement that had been reached by two parties of equal bargaining power
by a process of free negotiation.”).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 296–97.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part II.
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web page containing legal terms which a user assents to by continuing to
use the site after notice of the terms). 7
Courts validated these innovative contracting forms because they
approved of the business purpose of the terms. 8 Unfortunately,
businesses then exploited judicial validation of these contracting forms
to include terms lopsided in their favor. They used shrinkwraps,
clickwraps, and browsewraps to limit their business liability in a way
that was imperceptible to the consumer.
Critics of these new contract forms complain that they make a
mockery of longstanding contract formation doctrines by upsetting rules
of offer and acceptance, and subverting the notion of assent. 9 Others
approve the practicality of these ’wrap contracts 10 in an era of digital
information, mass consumer transactions, and online activity. 11 The
arguments of both sides have merit, yet the debate seems outworn.
Companies continue to employ ’wrap contracts, and courts generally
tend to enforce them even if they occasionally rein in wayward terms. 12
Many scholars have discussed at length their concerns regarding consent
in the online context. 13 Courts nevertheless have accepted ’wrap
contracts as valid contracting forms. Rather than attempt to stuff the
genie back in the bottle, this Article considers ways to better reflect the
intent of the parties and thereby enhance the legitimacy of the ’wrap
contract form. This Article adopts a practical view that attempts to
7. See Nancy S. Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REV. 797, 836–848 (2007) (discussing
the leading cases acknowledging shrinkwrap, clickwrap and browsewrap licenses).
8. See id.
9. For a sample of the scholarly commentary on this topic, see Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a
Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to Standard Form Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection
211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227, 228 (2007) (noting that consumers are clicking in “record numbers” to
agree to unfavorable one-sided terms); Kim, supra note 7 (discussing the lack of actual assent in ’wrap
contracts); Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 460 (2006) (criticizing terms of use
as contracts).
10. I use the term ’wrap contracts to refer to shrinkwrap, clickwrap and browsewrap contracts.
This article focuses primarily upon clickwrap and browsewrap contracts.
11. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Contract, Not Regulation: UCITA and High-Tech Consumers
Meet Their Consumer Protection Critics, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE ‘INFORMATION
ECONOMY’ 205, 208–14 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006) (noting that current licensing practices have
benefitted consumers by unleashing a wave of new products); Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L.
Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass Market Software License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 335, 342–43 (1996) (arguing that non-negotiated license agreements are efficient).
12. See infra Part II.
13. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 7; Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, in
CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE ‘INFORMATION ECONOMY,’ supra note 11, at 241; Robert
A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 429 (2002); Lemley, supra note 9; Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting,
57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1307 (2005); Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding
Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 1125 (2000).
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balance the legitimate needs of businesses to assess risks and contain
liabilities with the realities of the consumer contracting environment.
Most of the scholarly commentary concerning the treatment of online
contracts has focused on assent. Yet, as explained in Part IV, assent
cannot be so easily divorced from consideration. Currently, blanket
assent forces the burdens of innovative contracting to fall solely upon
the consumer while the website garners all the advantages. 14 For
example, companies aim to minimize the obtrusiveness of online
agreements. Unobtrusive contracts, however, primarily advantage
companies by allowing more onerous terms without also enhancing
consumer awareness.
The requirement of consideration may provide a workable alternative
to the all-or-nothing nature of assent.
This Article proposes
reconceptualizing the online bargain in a way that would more evenly
allocate the burdens of contracting innovation between the consumer
and the website or business. 15 This proposal distills a contract to its
essence. At its core, a contract is a mutually agreed upon exchange by
two or more parties that should reflect their intent. Most, if not all, mass
consumer contracts are not actual expressions of intent. Consent is not
freely given but presumed or constructed. Contract law, then, should be
concerned with developing ways to better express intent in an effort to
protect the reasonable expectations of contracting parties given the
contracting environment. 16 Contract law may be adequate to govern
digital era transactions; however, the application of that law must
account for the differences between online and offline contracting
environments. 17 This Article advocates a type of contract adaptation
that considers the changes wrought by the online environment and
14. For example, as Douglas Phillips notes,
[a]lthough EULAs may lower the transaction costs of software providers as compared to
individually negotiated licenses, they impose high transaction costs for any customer
wishing to understand the EULA’s legal effect. And in making the costs of such an
understanding prohibitive, they give the software provider an asymmetric information
advantage. This asymmetry results in transaction terms that are inefficient.
DOUGLAS E. PHILLIPS, THE SOFTWARE LICENSE UNVEILED 81 (2009).
15. I use the term “website” in this Article to refer to companies that operate websites for their
businesses.
16. See Moringiello, supra note 13, at 1309 (“Traditional contract rules, based on the model of
two individuals meeting face-to-face to negotiate written terms, have been modified over the years to
accommodate diverse methods of communicating those terms. In developing these modifications, courts
recognized the traditional cautionary function served by the signed paper contract and fashioned new
rules to account for the different signals sent to offerees by novel methods of contracting.”).
17. See id. (“The problems posed by Internet contracting” require not great overhaul of existing
law but an “adjustment to traditional rules to take into account the differences between paper and
electronic communications.”).
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champions the molding of contract law to conform to these shifting
realities. This approach thus acknowledges the reality of modern day
contracting including how contracts are actually employed by companies
and perceived by consumers in the online environment. Courts have
already adapted contract law to conform to marketplace changes. 18 This
Article urges them to do so in a more evenhanded manner.
’Wrap contracts, like other contracts of adhesion, contain one-sided
terms that have been drafted by the party with both the market power
and the technological ability to offer them on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
Users typically fail to read the terms. More information fails to
encourage reading if there is no meaningful way to access that
information and no ability to negotiate different terms. Contract design,
on the other hand, can signify intent in a way that words alone cannot. 19
The burden of signifying intent should fall to the website, which is the
only party capable of doing so.
Part II of this Article summarizes the evolution of contract’s form.
Part III then analyzes the expansion of contract’s function. This Article
uses figures of speech to illustrate how contracts protect or diminish the
parties’ legal rights and obligations. Part IV argues for and applies a
reconceptualization of consideration in the online environment. The
blanket nature of assent and recent case law enforcing ’wrap contracts
make the often-ignored doctrine of consideration a better starting point
for doctrinal innovation than assent. Part V concludes that courts should
require websites to use their technological capability to express the
intent of both parties in the online contracting environment. A more
balanced allocation of modern contracting’s burdens will strengthen the
legitimacy of modern consumer contracts.
II. EVOLUTION OF CONTRACT’S FORM
A contract is a legally enforceable promise. 20 As production of goods
became more sophisticated and specialized, and markets more
competitive, producers needed to plan for the future in order to
accurately calculate costs, maximize use of goods and capital, and
18. See infra Part II.
19. See Moringiello, supra note 13 (discussing the different signals sent by paper and electronic
contracts).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) (defining contract as “a promise or a set
of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in
some way recognizes as a duty”); FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 3 (defining contract as “a promise, or a
set of promises, that the law will enforce or at least recognize in some way”). Farnsworth notes that the
law of contracts is generally concerned with “exchanges that relate to the future.” FARNSWORTH, supra
note 2, at 4.
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remain in business. 21 Contract law developed in order to enforce
executory promises that were essential to a credit-based free enterprise
system. 22 Not surprisingly, contract law reflects the principles of
individualism and laissez faire that enabled the free market system to
flourish. 23 Under the traditional model of contract law, parties to a
contract are on roughly equal footing 24 and can avoid oppressive
contracts by shopping for terms and exercising their freedom of
choice. 25 But as the business environment changed, this model of
equality failed to reflect the reality of many contracting situations. 26

21. FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 8 (“Eventually . . . producers’ operations became more
complex, and they began buying raw materials from suppliers, employing others to work for them, and
selling through distributors. Producers then saw the need to plan for the future in order to compete with
other producers. An exchange of promises looking to a future exchange of performances would give a
producer the basis for predictable calculation.”).
22. Id. at 20; Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 629 (1943) (“With the development of a free enterprise system based
on an unheard of division of labor, capitalistic society needed a highly elastic legal institution to
safeguard the exchange of goods and services on the market. Common law lawyers, responding to this
social need, transformed ‘contract’ from the clumsy institution that it was in the sixteenth century into a
tool of almost unlimited usefulness and pliability. Contract thus became the indispensable instrument of
the enterpriser, enabling him to go about his affairs in a rational way.”).
23. See Kessler, supra note 22, at 630 (“[O]ur legal lore of contracts reflects a proud spirit of
individualism and of laissez faire. . . . Contract—the language of the cases tells us—is a private affair
and not a social institution. The judicial system, therefore, provides only for their interpretation, but the
courts cannot make contracts for the parties.”).
24. FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 295–96. See also Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144,
147 (Ind. 1971) (“The traditional contract is the result of free bargaining of parties who are brought
together by the play of the market, and who meet each other on a footing of approximate economic
equality.”).
25. Kessler, supra note 22, at 630. Kessler depicts traditional contract law as follows:
Either party is supposed to look out for his own interests and his own protection.
Oppressive bargains can be avoided by careful shopping around. Everyone has complete
freedom of choice with regard to his partner in contract, and the privity-of-contract
principle respects the exclusiveness of this choice. Since a contract is the result of the
free bargaining of parties who are brought together by the play of the market and who
meet each other on a footing of social and approximate economic equality, there is no
danger that freedom of contract will be a threat to the social order as a whole.
Id.
26. Id. at 631–32 (noting that mass production gave rise to the use of contracts of adhesion where
the parties did not have equal bargaining power). Clayton P. Gillette notes, “Standard forms dominate
both the consumer and the business environment so that only contracts that are sufficiently large,
complicated, or idiosyncratic enough to justify negotiation over more than the basic terms of quantity,
price, and delivery satisfy the meeting of the minds standard that underlies traditional notions of
consent.” Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679, 679.
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A. Mass Market Contracts
Industrialization enabled the mass production and sale of goods to
consumers. Businesses found it more efficient to create standard terms
for mass consumer transactions. 27 These standard terms were contained
in form agreements. 28 These form agreements differed from traditional
contracts because their terms were non-negotiable and offered to the
consumer on a “take it or leave it” basis. 29 They became known as
contracts of adhesion as the consumer was powerless to do anything
other than adhere to their terms. 30
Despite their shortcomings, courts and commentators generally
recognized that standard form agreements were efficient and, to varying
degrees, socially beneficial. 31 The Second Restatement of the Law
Governing Contracts (Second Restatement) acknowledged that
standardized agreements were essential to an economic system reliant
upon mass production and distribution:
Scarce and costly time and skill can be devoted to a class of transactions
rather than to details of individual transactions. . . . Sales personnel and
customers are freed from attention to numberless variations and can focus
on meaningful choice among a limited number of significant features:
transaction-type, style, quantity, price, or the like. Operations are
simplified and costs reduced, to the advantage of all concerned. 32

Because of their advantages, the use of standard form contracts
27. Kessler, supra note 22, at 631 (“The development of large scale enterprise with its mass
production and mass distribution made a new type of contract inevitable—the standardized mass
contract.”).
28. Id. at 631.
29. Id. at 632.
30. FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 297 (“[T]he only alternative to complete adherence is outright
rejection.”). See also Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 1971) (“[I]n present-day
commercial life the standardized mass contract has appeared. It is used primarily by enterprises with
strong bargaining power and position. The weaker party, in need of the good or services, is frequently
not in a position to shop around for better terms, either because the author of the standard contract has a
monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all competitors use the same clauses.”). The term “contracts
of adhesion” is credited to Edwin Patterson, who used it in the context of insurance policies. See Edwin
W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 (1919).
31. Kessler, supra note 22, at 630 (“In so far as the reduction of costs of production and
distribution thus achieved is reflected in reduced prices, society as a whole ultimately benefits from the
use of standard contracts.”); FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 296 (“Since standard forms can be tailored
to fit office routines and mechanical equipment, they simplify operations and reduce costs.”); Todd D.
Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1222 (1983)
(“Form documents promote efficiency within a complex organizational structure.”); Robert A. Hillman,
Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 747 (2002) (While “[s]tandard-form exchanges obviously
do not constitute the paradigm ‘bargain’ of classical contract law with the parties on equal footing and
each term separately negotiated,” they “benefit both sellers and consumers.” (emphasis added)).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1981).
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proliferated. Judicial recognition of adhesion contracts meant that other
legal controls were required to keep abusive or socially harmful
contracting practices at bay. Courts developed interpretation rules that
recognized the limitations of standard form contracts. 33 For example,
they interpreted ambiguous contract terms against the drafter. 34 Courts
evaluating insurance contracts adopted the “reasonable expectations”
rule set forth in Section 211(3) of the Second Restatement and held that
if one party has reason to believe that the other party would not have
entered into the agreement “if he knew that the writing contained a
particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.” 35
The abuses of standard form contracts were also addressed by certain
sections of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Perhaps the most
notable was Section 2-302, which empowers courts to invalidate
contracts on the grounds of unconscionability. 36 Other UCC sections
treated merchants differently from consumers, recognizing that
merchants had greater bargaining power vis-à-vis other merchants than
did consumers. 37 Section 2-207 addressed the problem of the “Battle of
the Forms,” whereby merchants sought to have the terms of their form

33. FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 297–98 (noting that courts have developed “several
techniques” to avoid harsh results in hard cases). See also Moringiello, supra note 13, at 1333–40
(discussing a half-century of cases in which courts have found a duty to explain terms where terms were
delivered mechanically or where the contractual nature of the document was unclear).
34. See Florence Nightingale Nursing Serv., Inc. v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama, 41 F.3d
1476, 1481 (11th Cir. 1995) (“If the claimant has established a reasonable interpretation, then under
contra proferentem, which requires ambiguities to be construed against the drafter of a document, the
claimaint’s interpretation is taken as correct.”); HPI/GSA-3C, LLC v. Perry, 364 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (applying the rule of contra proferentem where contract had latent ambiguity); Kunin v.
Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 539 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[A]mbiguities in insurance contracts
must be construed against the insurer.”).
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981); Chicago & N. W. Transp. Co. v.
Emmet Fertilizer & Grain Co., 852 F.2d 358, 360 (8th Cir. 1988) (declining to give drafting party the
benefit of ambiguous language where “it relies on an undeclared interpretation of the license terms
which it should have known would have been unacceptable to (the non-drafting party) at the time of
negotiation”); Lancaster v. United States Shoe Corp., 934 F. Supp. 1137, 1140 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(holding that denial of benefits was improper under the reasonable expectations doctrine).
36. Section 2-302(1) states that if a court
finds the contract or any term of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it
was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the unconscionable term, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.
U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2003).
37. See, e.g., id. § 2-201(2) (providing that a failure to object to a confirmation of the contract
within ten days satisfies the writing requirement under the statute of frauds if the transaction is between
merchants); id. § 2-207 (addressing contract formation and incorporation of terms by exchange of
merchant commercial forms); id. § 2-314 (implied warranty of merchantability applies where seller is a
merchant).
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agreement prevail by submitting them last. 38 Under this section,
additional or different terms in form acceptances or order confirmations
are “proposals” which may require express acceptance in certain
circumstances. 39 The irony of course is that after ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 40 and its progeny, Section 2-207 effectively provides
greater protection from standard form contract terms to merchants than
to consumers, who generally do not fall under its provisions. 41
B. Mass Market Software Licenses and the Rise of ’Wrap Agreements
As with standard form agreements generally, mass consumer software
When personal
licenses developed out of business necessity. 42
computers were first introduced in the mass consumer marketplace,
software companies were uncertain about whether copyright law
protected software. 43 Even with copyright’s protections, software
producers were concerned about how to protect their products, which are
easily reproducible and distributable. 44 Licensing software—rather than
38. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 168–69 (discussing the “battle of the forms” and the
intent of the UCC drafters to use § 2-207 “to reduce the number of situations in which a party can seize
upon a discrepancy in the forms as an excuse for not performing”).
39. U.C.C. § 2-207.
40. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
41. Id. at 1452 (stating that because there is only one form involved in a consumer transaction,
section 2-207 is irrelevant). But see Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339 (D.Kan.
2000) (noting that nothing in the language of section 2-207 “precludes application in a case which
involves only one form”).
42. See Thomas M.S. Hemnes, Restraints on Alienation, Equitable Servitudes, and the Feudal
Nature of Computer Software Licensing, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 577, 578 (1994) (discussing how, in the
absence of protection under copyright and patent laws, “[l]awyers for software developers were
therefore driven to the conclusion that trade secret law provided the only protection for their clients’
programs”). Hemnes further explains that because a restriction on non-disclosure or resale on post-sales
copies of software may have constituted a restraint on alienation, “[t]o get around the conflict between
the need for non-disclosure on the one hand, and the right of alienation on the other, lawyers invented
the software license.” Id. at 580. See also Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap
Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1242–43 (1995) (explaining how the copyrightability of software
remained uncertain until the 1980 amendments to the Copyright Act); Michael J. Madison,
Reconstructing the Software License, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 275, 313–14 (2003) (noting that software
developers needed a mechanism to protect their copyrights and proprietary interests while sharing their
products with others); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Defining the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract:
Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479, 488–90 (1995) (noting the
differences between the “soft copy” and “hard copy” world and how they might compel licensing).
43. The U.S. Copyright Office permitted copyright registration on computer programs in 1964.
Note, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1274, 1274 (1964). See also
Robert L. Oakley, Fairness in Electronic Contracting: Minimum Standards for Non-Negotiated
Contracts, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1041, 1048–49 (2005) (noting the “considerable uncertainty . . . about the
scope of copyright protection for software” which prompted software producers to use licenses to
protect their interests).
44. Oakley, supra note 43, at 1048–49.
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selling it—enabled software producers to bypass the first sale doctrine
which would have enabled consumers to transfer possession of their
copy of a software product. 45 Furthermore, the first sale doctrine would
have given software purchasers certain “fair use” rights, such as the right
to make copies for purposes of interoperability. 46 By using a license,
software companies could continue to control their product even after
they had relinquished physical possession of it; however, they wanted
the benefits of a license without the transactional hassle of having the
customer sign anything. Accordingly, they bundled written terms with
their products, encasing in plastic wrap both the paper containing the
terms as well as the compact disc containing the software program.
These terms became known as “shrinkwrap” licenses. 47 Earlier cases
questioned the validity of shrinkwrap licenses, 48 but after the Seventh
Circuit upheld shrinkwrap agreements in the oft-cited case ProCD, Inc.
v. Zeidenberg, 49 most courts followed suit. 50 Judge Easterbrook’s
opinion in ProCD exemplifies judicial prioritization of business needs
over doctrinal fidelity. 51
The validation of the shrinkwrap license paved the way for the
acceptance of the “clickwrap” and “browsewrap” forms for online
transactions. A clickwrap license is a digital agreement whose terms the
user accepts by clicking on an icon that expresses consent or nonconsent, such as “I Accept” or “I Decline.” 52 Courts have approved
clickwrap agreements, finding that a “click” accepts the terms contained
on the website, even if the terms are viewable only through a
hyperlink. 53 A browsewrap license contains the terms that govern the
45. See Nancy S. Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1103, 1111–12
(discussing the implications of the first sale doctrine on software).
46. See id.; Jessica Litman, Copyright and Information Policy, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
185, 197–98 (1992); David A. Rice, Licensing the Use of Computer Program Copies and the Copyright
Act First Sale Doctrine, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 157, 163 (1990).
47. Lemley, supra note 42, at 1241.
48. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding a “boxtop” license invalid under the UCC); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir.
1988) (finding that shrinkwrap license was preempted by federal copyright law).
49. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
50. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Adobe Sys., Inc. v. One
Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630,
638–39 (8th Cir. 2005). Not all courts, however, have upheld shrinkwrap licenses. See Klocek v.
Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1340–41 (D. Kan. 2000); Wachter Mgmt. Co. v. Dexter &
Chaney, Inc., 144 P.3d 747 (Kan. 2006).
51. In addition to noting that ProCD’s database product could probably not be copyrighted,
Judge Easterbrook stressed the importance of price discrimination, citing it as a cornerstone of ProCD’s
business model and an advantage to consumers. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449–1450.
52. See Lemley, supra note 9, at 459–460.
53. Id. at 459 (“Every court to consider the issue has found ‘clickwrap’ licenses, in which an
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use of a website or product. 54 These terms are usually hidden in an
interior page that can be accessed only by clicking on a hyperlink at the
bottom of a web page, which is marked “Terms of Use,” “Legal Notice,”
or the like. 55 The user is not required to click “I agree” to the terms. 56
While courts formerly distinguished between the form of a clickwrap
and a browsewrap, they are now concerned primarily with whether the
user had notice. 57
III. EXPANSION OF CONTRACT’S FUNCTION
This Part III examines the expansion of contract’s function that
accommodated the evolution of contract’s form from negotiated
agreement to standard form to shrinkwrap and then clickwrap and
browsewrap. In doing so, this Article employs figures of speech 58 to
better illustrate a particular contractual purpose.
A. Contract as Shield
Some provisions in standard form contracts limit the liability of the
contract drafter for the product or service it offers to the other party. 59
An example of this type of provision is a limited warranty or a warranty
disclaimer. Companies need to assess the risks of entering into a
particular type of business, producing a particular type of product, or
entering into a particular type of transaction, especially given the
uncertainty generated by tort and product liability law. Contract law
online user clicks ‘I agree’ to standard form terms, enforceable.”); Juliet M. Moringiello & William L.
Reynolds, Survey of the Law of Cyberspace: Electronic Contracting Cases 2007–2008, 64 BUS. LAW.
199, 200 (2008) (“By now the law seems pretty well-settled that a mere click of agreement on a web site
acts as an acceptance of an offer to do what the web site proposes—and of the terms contained on the
web site—even if those terms can only be reached by a hyperlink.”).
54. Lemley, supra note 9, at 460.
55. Christina L. Kunz et al., Browse-Wrap Agreements: Validity of Implied Assent in Electronic
Form Agreements, 59 BUS. LAW. 279 (2003).
56. Id.
57. Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 53, at 200 (noting that “courts were not paying much
attention to the once much-mooted distinction between browsewrap and clickwrap” and focused instead
on whether the seller provided enough information “so that the buyer could know for what, if anything,
it was contracting”). But see Ronald J. Mann & Travis Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The Reality of
Internet Retail Contracting, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 984, 993 (2008) (“A well-advised website designer
would require some affirmative action from the user, indicative of assent to the document in question, in
order to reliably produce a binding contract.”).
58. Metaphors and similes are figures of speech. A simile compares two unlike things, often in a
phrase using “like” or “as.” WEBSTER’S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1029 (1995) [hereinafter
WEBSTER’S]. A metaphor transfers a term from an object that it ordinarily designates to an object it may
designate only by analogy. Id. at 688.
59. See Kunz et al., supra note 55, at 281 & n.11.
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enables parties to establish the rules of the transactions. The drafter of a
form contract uses the contract as a shield to protect itself from claims
by the other party and to contain or limit the responsibility it would have
for the product or service it introduces into the marketplace.
There are implied warranties for sales of goods under the UCC. 60
Sellers, however, are able to disclaim these implied warranties using
specific, expressly disclaiming, conspicuous language. 61 The UCC,
recognizing a company’s need to assess and contain risks, permits
businesses to both limit their liability and disclaim implied warranties. 62
An unintended consequence of this ability, however, may be that it
further perpetuates the use of standard form contracts to govern
commercial transactions.
The introduction of digital products on a mass consumer level brought
with it a somewhat different shield function. The digital product owner
uses a contract (i.e. a shrinkwrap license) to draw boundaries of use
around its product. In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, for example, one of
the relevant provisions in the shrinkwrap license stated:
The listings on this product are licensed for authorized users only. The
user agreement provides that copying of the software and the data may be
done only for individual or personal use and that distribution, sublicense
or lease of the software or the data is prohibited. The agreement provides
60. U.C.C. § 2-314 (2003) (“[A] warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a
contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.”); id. § 2-315
(“Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the
goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish
suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the
goods shall be fit for such purpose.”).
61. Id. § 2-316(2) (“[I]n a consumer contract, the language must be in a record, be conspicuous,
and state ‘The seller undertakes no responsibility for the quality of goods except as otherwise provided
in this contract’ . . . .”).
62. Id. § 2-719(1)(a) (“[T]he agreement may provide for remedies . . . in substitution for those
provided in this Article and may limit or alter the measure of damages recoverable . . . .”); id. § 2-719(3)
(“Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is
unconscionable.”). An exclusive remedy, however, should not “fail of its essential purpose.” Id. § 2719(2).
The federal consumer protection law, the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act, does not permit
disclaimers of implied warranties if the product is accompanied by a written warranty but does not
require any warranty whatsoever. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(2) (2006) (“Nothing in this title . . . shall be
deemed . . . to require that a consumer product or any of its components be warranted.”); 15 U.S.C.
§ 2308(a) (2006) (“No supplier may disclaim or modify . . . any implied warranty to a consumer with
respect to such consumer product if . . . such supplier makes any written warranty to the consumer with
respect to such consumer product . . . .”). The Magnuson–Moss Act does, however, permit limitations
of liability provided there is a “repair, replace or refund” remedy. See 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3) (2006)
(“[S]uch warrantor may not exclude or limit consequential damages for breach of any written or implied
warranty on such product, unless such exclusion or limitation conspicuously appears on the face of the
warranty . . . .”); id. § 2304(a)(4) (“[S]uch warrantor must permit the consumer to elect with a refund
for, or replacement without charge of, such product or part . . . .”).
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expressly that:
[Y]ou will not make the Software or the Listings in whole or in part
available to any other user in any networked or time-shared
environment, or transfer the Listings in whole or in part to any
computer other than the computer used to access the Listings. 63

This contract provision was used to set limitations around the
consumer’s use of the product, thus “shielding” the software producer’s
business model from unfair business practices. The software producer,
as the copyright holder, sold the license to use the software to the
consumer. The scope of that license was contained in the shrinkwrap.
Given the susceptibility of digital products to unauthorized copying and
distribution, the Seventh Circuit enforced this shielding function and
upheld the shrinkwrap as a valid contracting form. 64 Given the blanket
nature of contractual assent, 65 however, acceptance of the shielding
provisions meant acceptance of the provisions that served functions
other than shielding.
B. Contract as Sword
A contract provision may serve a function other than simply shielding
the drafter from liability for unfair or unauthorized business practices; it
may affect and terminate rights held by the other party. One might
argue that a limitation of liability or a warranty disclaimer also
terminates a party’s rights by prohibiting recovery for damages that
would otherwise be available under contract law. Yet, the UCC
expressly permits a party to do just that. 66 Regardless of whether
software transactions are “sales” under the purview of the UCC, 67 the
63. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 645 (W.D. Wis. 1996), rev’d, 86 F.3d 1447
(7th Cir. 1996).
64. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
65. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 (1970)
(noting that assent to boilerplate clauses means assent to “the few dickered terms, . . . the broad type of
the transaction, and . . . a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent
terms . . . which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms”). Many courts
and commentators have taken Llewellyn’s words to mean that there should be a “presumption” of assent
to standard terms that are not unfair in presentation or substance. See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 455 (2002)
(“[T]he current legal approach supports Karl Llewellyn’s vision that the law should create a presumption
of assent (or ‘blanket assent’) to standard terms.”).
66. See supra notes 60–62.
67. For a discussion of whether software transactions are “licenses” or “sales,” see Kim, supra
note 45. See also Richard A. Epstein, ProCD v. Zeidenberg: Do Doctrine and Function Mix?, in
CONTRACTS STORIES 94, 100–04 (Douglas G. Baird ed., 2007) (discussing the implications of
categorizing a software transaction as a license or a sale, including the applicability of the UCC
provisions governing contract formation).
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UCC can provide guidance regarding what are generally accepted fair
and reasonable commercial practices. The limitation and warranty
disclaimers are directly tied to the liability attached to the use of the
product and reflects the drafter’s attempt to calculate the risk of doing
business, the risk of producing a particular product, or both. They are
part of the product offering. Similarly, the license grant is part of what
the seller/licensor is offering to the buyer/licensee. Essentially, the
license is permission to use and a concomitant promise by the
seller/licensor not to sue provided the buyer adheres to the scope of the
license. The promise not to sue does not extend beyond any use greater
than that expressly granted. The “assent” of the buyer/licensee then is
not essential to the license grant, warranty disclaimer, or limitation of
liability provisions.
By contrast, contract provisions which serve a “sword” function
destroy the other party’s rights 68 that are unrelated to the use of the
product. Exclusive jurisdiction or mandatory arbitration clauses, for
example, aim to destroy the non-drafting party’s ability to bring a
lawsuit in civil court or in a state that would otherwise have jurisdiction
over the disputed matter. To illustrate, the following provision from a
MySpace browsewrap serves a sword function because the MySpace
member must submit to the governing law and exclusive jurisdiction of
New York and must waive the right to a jury trial even though these
matters pertain to ancillary issues of dispute resolution and not to the use
of the networking service:
Disputes. The Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in
accordance with, the laws of the State of New York, without regard to its
conflict of law provisions. You and MySpace agree to submit to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the courts located within the State of New York
to resolve any dispute arising out of the Agreement or the MySpace
Services.
EACH OF THE PARTIES HEREBY KNOWINGLY,
VOLUNTARILY AND INTENTIONALLY WAIVES ANY RIGHT IT
MAY HAVE TO A TRIAL BY JURY IN RESPECT OF ANY
LITIGATION (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY CLAIMS,
COUNTERCLAIMS, CROSS-CLAIMS, OR THIRD PARTY CLAIMS)
ARISING OUT OF, UNDER OR IN CONNECTION WITH THIS
AGREEMENT. 69

68. This Article uses the term “rights” in a broader way to encompass Hohfeld’s notion of
“privileges.” See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judical Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
69. Myspace.com, Terms & Conditions, http://www.myspace.com/help/terms (last visited Mar.
22, 2011).
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A contract provision that functions as a sword should trigger more
scrutiny by courts than those provisions that serve a shield function.
While a company may legitimately carve out the scope of any license it
grants and may limit its liability for damages, it should be permitted to
take away the other party’s rights only when it attains the other party’s
specific and actual assent. 70 Unfortunately, as currently construed, the
blanket nature of assent is an all-or-nothing proposition, meaning that
either a contract is formed in its entirety or not at all (even if specific
provisions might be deemed unenforceable under a contract defense,
such as unconscionability). Thus, the blanket assent approach requires a
court that desires to acknowledge proper formation of shield provisions
to acknowledge proper formation of sword provisions.
Judicial recognition of sword provisions, however, is more unsettling.
Although the consumer has no ability to negotiate either a sword or
shield provision with the mass software producer, the shield provisions
are less troubling because they are directly tied to the use of the product.
The software producer—not the consumer—should be the one to
determine what type of product it offers to the consumer, including the
scope of the license and the warranty, if any. The sword provisions, on
the other hand, affect rights or entitlements that belong to the consumer.
Courts have tried to respond to sword provisions by requiring notice and
refusing to enforce sword provisions that constitute an unfair surprise.
In Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., for example, the Second
Circuit refused to enforce an arbitration clause in a browsewrap
agreement due to lack of notice. 71
As troubling as sword provisions may be, their purpose, like those of
shield provisions, is to enable the drafting party to assess and minimize
the risks of doing business by reducing costs and uncertainty. In other
words, the ultimate function of sword provisions is shielding. In most
cases, the company would not have agreed to enter into the transaction
without the protection afforded by both the sword and shield provisions.
Unfortunately, both sword and shield provisions have paved the way for
contract provisions that do more than simply reduce business risk.
C. Contract as Crook
This Article uses the metaphor of a “crook” 72 to describe a company’s
stealthy appropriation (via a non-negotiated agreement), of benefits
70. See Kim, supra note 7, at 826–34.
71. Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d. Cir. 2002).
72. WEBSTER’S, supra note 58, at 268 (defining “crook” as “a bent or curved object:HOOK” and
“[o]ne who lives by dishonest means”).
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ancillary or unrelated to the consideration that is the subject of the
transaction. Prior to the advent of ’wrap contracts, standard form
agreements generally performed sword and shield functions. Even if
their limitations of warranties and exclusions reduced the value of the
bargain for the consumer, contracts of adhesion typically did not seek to
extract additional benefits from consumers that were not part of the
primary transaction without the consumer’s actual, specific assent. For
example, a hotel that charged an additional fee for late check-outs would
have its customers separately initial the rate and late check-out fee.
The physical constraints of paper agreements acted as a natural rein
on companies’ contracting behavior as companies were generally
reluctant to repel potential customers with multi-page contracts that
required a signature. Even though shrinkwrap agreements did not
require a signature, they too, were typically limited in size due to the
impracticability, cost, and general undesirability of enclosing a bulky
contract with a software product. With judicial validation of the
clickwrap and browsewrap forms, however, companies further expanded
the reach of their contractual clauses. They began to use contracts to
extract from consumers additional benefits that were unrelated to the
transaction. Given that digital terms are weightless, reproduction and
distribution costs non-existent, and consumers highly unlikely to read
online agreements, companies could add additional terms with no
concomitant financial or reputational cost. Companies began using their
online agreements to do more than contain costs and assess the risks of
doing business. For example, the browsewrap of one social networking
site gives it an “irrevocable, perpetual, nonexclusive, fully-paid and
worldwide license” to user content. 73 While the website needs a license
to post user content, the license that it gives itself is much broader than
is strictly required to protect itself from liability. Most consumers are
likely unaware of the rights granted via these crook provisions since
most consumers fail to read online agreements. 74 More troubling, at
least some consumers would have declined the primary transaction if

73. See Friendster, Friendster Terms of Service, http://www.friendster.com/info/tos.php (last
visited Jan. 16, 2011).
74. See, e.g., Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read
the Fine Print? Testing a Law and Economics Approach to Standard Form Contracts 3 (N.Y. Univ. Sch.
of Law, Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 09-40, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1443256 (finding that “only about one or two in one thousand shoppers” of software access a
product’s EULA for at least one second.). Recently, a computer game retailer included a clause in its
online contract that gave it a right to the “souls” of 7,500 of its online customers. 7,500 Online
Shoppers Unknowingly Sold Their Souls, FOXNEWS.COM (Apr. 15, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/
scitech/2010/04/15/online-shoppers-unknowingly-sold-souls/.
The customers had the option of
nullifying the soul-claiming clause but very few did so. Id.
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they had known about the additional benefits being extracted via the
crook provisions. For example, Facebook users threatened to defect in
droves when they discovered that the company, via a crook provision,
intended to retain a perpetual license to user generated content. 75
Companies may also use crook provisions to resell and share customer
personal information. 76
The crook is a more apt metaphor than the sword because the
customer’s use of the information or extraction of the entitlement is
appropriated rather than destroyed. Furthermore, unlike sword or shield
provisions, a crook provision is not designed to protect a company’s
business or assess its risks. Where a sword or shield provision is used,
the purpose is defensive in that the company anticipates an undesired
use or an offensive move by the consumer, such as a lawsuit, and the
company seeks to curtail that use or block that move. By contrast, a
crook provision anticipates no such offensive action by the consumer
and has no direct relationship with the product or services offered by the
company.
IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE ONLINE BARGAIN
Given the uniqueness of internet contracting, some have questioned
whether contract law is up to the task of governing online transactions. 77
Consumers signing their name on a piece of paper register the
significance of entering into a contract, even if they have no power to
shape the terms of that contract. An online consumer, by contrast, may
not even be cognizant of having entered into a contract. 78 Consumers

75. Brad Stone & Brian Stelter, Facebook Withdraws Changes in Data Use, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
18, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/19/technology/internet/19facebook.html.
76. See, for example, Amazon’s privacy policy, which requires visiting both the Conditions of
Use and Privacy Policy web pages. Amazon.com, Conditions of Use, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/
customer/display.html/ref=footer_cou?ie=UTF8&nodeId=508088 (last visited May 18, 2011);
Amazon.com, Privacy Notice, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=footer_
privacy?ie=UTF8&nodeId=468496 (last visited May 18, 2011). Similarly, J.Crew’s privacy policy
requires the visitor to click on two separate links. J.Crew.com, Terms of Use, http://www.jcrew.com/
footer/termsofuse.jsp (last visited May 18, 2011); Jcrew.com, Our Privacy Policy,
http://www.jcrew.com/footer/privacy.jsp (last visited May 18, 2011).
77. For a discussion of the issue of electronic contracting and contract doctrine, see Hillman &
Rachlinski, supra note 65, at 432 (finding that while the online environment “changes some of the
dynamics of standard-form contracting . . . , these difference do not call for a radically different legal
regime”).
78. Professor Richard Hillman conducted a study with his first year Contracts class of ninety-two
students and found that few of them read more than the description of the goods and the price. Robert
A. Hillman, Online Consumer Standard Form Contracting Practices: A Survey and Discussion of Legal
Implications, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE ‘INFORMATION ECONOMY,’ supra note 11,
at 285, 286–94. An informal survey of my own first year Contracts students revealed that most of them
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register keystrokes, not clicks. A recent study conducted by Rainer
Bohme and Stefan Kopsell found that users tended to blindly accept
terms whose presentation resembled an end user license agreement,
probably because the ubiquity of such agreements have trained users to
“accept” their terms without reading them. 79 As noted earlier, clicking
is not even required for some courts to recognize a contract; a user may
be deemed to have “accepted” the terms of a browsewrap merely by
visiting a website.
As previously mentioned, most of the commentary regarding online
contracts centers around whether there was assent. 80 Courts have
typically tied the validity of assent to notice. Generally, if there was
notice of the terms, the consumer is deemed to have manifested assent. 81
Clickwrap agreements are generally less problematic from a notice
standpoint than browsewrap agreements, but again, the crucial
distinction lies in the existence of notice, rather than the form.
This Part argues that the doctrine of consideration—as opposed to
assent—is a more robust method of addressing the problems of online
contracts. The blanket nature of assent makes it an inflexible vehicle for
mass consumer transactions. 82
Consideration may provide a
workaround this inflexibility.
A. Consideration and Form, Revisited
Before delving into this proposed reconceptualization of the online
bargain, it is necessary to define what is meant by consideration. This is
not an easy task. Karl Llewelyn once noted, “‘Consideration’ is not in
any meaningful sense a topic. The term . . . relates to no unified body of
states or problems of fact.” 83 The Second Restatement defines
consideration somewhat obliquely by stating that “to constitute
were unaware that they may have entered into a contract with their online bank, their social networking
website, or their email provider.
79. RAINER BÖHME & STEFAN KÖPSELL, 2010 ACM CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN
COMPUTING SYS., TRAINED TO ACCEPT? A FIELD EXPERIMENT ON CONSENT DIALOGS 2403 (2010),
available at http://www1.inf.tu-dresden.de/~rb21/publications/BK2010_Trained_To_Accept_CHI.pdf.
80. For a broader, contextual approach to the problem of online contracts in the context of
privacy, see Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (on
file with author) (proposing that courts abandon a strict reliance on standard form contract doctrine in
privacy disputes and consider contextual factors).
81. Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 53, at 434 (noting that courts discuss whether the buyer
had notice of the terms rather than whether those terms were substantively fair).
82. Elsewhere, I have proposed eradicating the concept of “blanket assent.” See Kim, supra note
7. This Article, however, addresses another possible solution to the problem of online agreements.
83. K.N. Llewelyn, On the Complexity of Consideration: A Foreword, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 777,
778 (1941).
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consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained
for.” 84 A performance or return promise is bargained for “if it is sought
by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the
promisee in exchange for that promise.” 85 As the Farnsworth treatise
states, “[v]irtually anything that anyone would bargain for in exchange
for a promise can be consideration for that promise. . . . [A]s long as
part of what is given in exchange for a promise is consideration it is
immaterial that the rest is not.” 86
These definitions are all ways of describing consideration as the price
the offeree knowingly pays to get what the offeror is offering. This
Article deliberately uses the word “knowingly” instead of “willingly,” as
the latter term may cause one to infer voluntariness or desire to enter
into a contract, rather than need or lack of choice. The unfortunate truth
is that in mass consumer transactions, the consumer typically does not
desire to accept the contract terms, but does so in order to obtain the
good or service.
In a classic article, Lon Fuller identified the functions of
consideration. 87 The first is evidentiary. 88 Consideration may also
provide a cautionary or deterrent function. 89 Finally, the requirement of
consideration may provide a channeling function in that it signals the
enforceability of the promise, thus furnishing a “simple and external test
of enforceability.” 90 Furthermore, “whatever tends to accomplish one of
these purposes will also tend to accomplish the other two.” 91
Both assent and consideration are essential to contract formation, but
consideration has received scant attention in the academic literature on
’wrap contracts. One notable exception is an article by Robert Hillman
and Maureen O’Rourke concerning consideration and open source
licenses. 92 Hillman and O’Rourke observe that the doctrine of
consideration “has always been something of a mystery and working out
how it does or does not apply in the open source software setting
increases our understanding of how the principle has served, and should
continue to serve society.” 93 After a brief discussion of Fuller’s
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(1) (1981).
85. Id. § 71(2).
86. FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 47.
87. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941).
88. Id. at 800.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 801.
91. Id. at 803.
92. Robert A. Hillman & Maureen A. O’Rourke, Rethinking Consideration in the Electronic
Age, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 311 (2009).
93. Id. at 315.
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justifications for consideration, the authors conclude that “the most
promising explanations for the consideration doctrine” are “the value of
bargains and the capacity of our institutions to administer them.” 94 The
authors spend the remainder of their article analyzing consideration in
the context of open source licenses. 95
Hillman and O’Rourke first address the arguments both for and
against viewing open source licenses as contracts. 96 Generally, open
source licenses permit copyholders to use, transfer, copy, and modify
software and source code, provided that any derivative work is subject to
the same license terms regarding all or some portion of the subsequent
work. 97 The open source model thus seeks to further the development
and improvement of software by facilitating access to source code.
Some have argued that open source licenses are not contracts because
they lack consideration. 98 O’Rourke and Hillman argue that open
source licenses do not lack consideration and are valid contracts. 99
Their conclusion rests primarily upon the social value of open source
licenses and the capability of courts to enforce these licenses. 100 The
authors also mention the issue of assent, noting that “under current
practices, open source licenses rarely satisfy the notice and formation
requirement of contract-formation law” but that they could do so by
employing the clickwrap or shrinkwrap format. 101
Yet, the concepts of consideration and assent are necessarily
intertwined because one can have neither the motive nor the desire to
give up something in exchange for something else, without knowing
what one will be expected to give up. Not only does the open source
license convey broad rights, it also imposes obligations upon the
licensee that are independent of how the licensee uses the software. The
open source license thus asks too much of the licensee without the
licensee’s actual assent. It is precisely because the open source license
goes beyond defining the boundaries of use that actual assent should be
required. Not surprisingly, even sophisticated users of open source

94. Id. at 320.
95. While there are many types of open source licenses, typically the term refers to the
relinquishment of a software developer’s copyrights to software code provided that subsequent users
maintain the openness of any derivative works.
96. Hillman & O’Rourke, supra note 92, at 328–35.
97. Id. at 313–314.
98. Id. at 314.
99. Id. at 328.
100. Id. at 330 (“[C]ourts should have little difficulty applying a contractual framework to open
source licenses.”).
101. Id. at 332–33.
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software routinely run afoul of their license requirements. 102 Given the
potential for enormous liability for violating these licenses, 103 open
source licensors should do more than set forth terms in a ’wrap
agreement.
Hillman and O’Rourke briefly discuss the importance of knowledge
or awareness of terms to contract formation. They conclude:
a contract is formed when a licensee acquires the software, such as by
downloading it, even if the licensee does not have to manifest assent to
the restrictions and even before the licensee modifies or distributes the
software. The act of acquiring the software (assuming the licensee has
knowledge of the restrictions) constitutes an implied-in-fact acceptance of
the terms of use. 104

Yet, knowledge cannot be so cleanly separated from consideration.
While the question of notice, constructive or actual, is typically
associated with assent, it is also relevant to consideration. The issue of
whether something is sought by the promisor involves motive. The
Second Restatement, for example, notes that in a typical bargain, “the
consideration and the promise bear a reciprocal relation of motive or
inducement: the consideration induces the making of the promise and
the promise induces the furnishing of the consideration.” 105 In other
words, why did the promisor offer what she did—was it in exchange for
the promisee’s (or a third party’s) promise or performance? For
example, assume that X promises to Y that X will mow Y’s lawn for
$50. X’s motive in making the promise to Y to mow Y’s lawn is to get
paid $50. X is induced to promise to mow Y’s lawn by Y’s promise to
pay $50.
Now, assume instead that X promises to mow Y’s lawn in exchange
for $50 and a bag of oranges. Assume further that while Y knew that X
expected a payment of $50 for mowing Y’s lawn, Y did not know that X
also expected a bag of oranges at no additional cost. It would be absurd
to speak in terms of Y’s motive in giving up the bag of oranges if Y had
not even known that it was part of the transaction. Furthermore, it
seems that X should not be allowed to claim that X was induced to mow
102. Ashlee Vance, The Defenders of Free Software, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/business/26ping.html (“[S]ome companies, even some technology
savvy ones, may be violating the rather easy-to-follow requirements associated with free software
licenses. . . . Quite often, companies that fail to live up to these requirements do so out of ignorance
about the rules of engagement. Nonetheless, they become exposed to potentially expensive lawsuits.”).
103. An attorney who handles open source license cases noted, “‘The thing that terrifies
companies is the thought of shipping millions of TVs or phones and then having someone figure out that
you didn’t follow the licensing requirements. . . . It could be very costly.’” Id.
104. Hillman & O’Rourke, supra note 92, at 331.
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. b (1981).
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Y’s lawn by both the $50 and the bag of oranges if X did not make clear
that the bag of oranges was part of the consideration. A reasonable
person in Y’s position could not be expected to know that X expected
both $50 and a bag of oranges because typically those in Y’s position
pay money, and only money, for lawn mowing services. X’s stealth
“add-on” to the bargain should not be considered part of the bargain
without Y’s actual, specific consent.
In finding that open source licenses are, in fact, contracts, Hillman
and O’Rourke focus on the substantive justifications for consideration.
But in doing so, they ignore how open source licenses undermine the
other important justifications of consideration, those of form. While
adopting clickwrap and shrinkwrap contracts may satisfy the diluted
version of offer, acceptance, and assent that courts use in the online
context, the ’wrap forms do not fulfill the functions of consideration.
The purpose of consideration is to enhance the reliability of testimony in
cases of contract dispute, encourage deliberation before entering into
contracts, and signify an intent to enter into a transaction that is legally
binding. 106 Online contracts greatly diminish and often undermine all
three of these functions. 107 Studies have indicated that consumers
automatically click to accept terms of online agreements, if they are
even asked to click on anything at all. 108 A consumer may simply be
browsing a website without intent to be legally bound by contractual
terms. Given that many websites state that they have the ability to
modify their contractual terms at any time—without making the
consumer aware of such change— ’wrap agreements fail to satisfy even
the evidentiary function. For example, the website of the Poetry
Foundation states:
This Privacy Policy may be modified at any time and without notice to
you. It is your responsibility to visit this web page frequently to review
carefully the current Privacy Policy. Each and every time you access the
Web site you shall be deemed to have agreed to the then current Privacy
Policy. 109

This language is commonly found in browsewraps.

Youtube, for

106. Fuller, supra note 87, at 799.
107. Randy Barnett has argued that manifested consent can substitute for an informed bargainedfor-exchange: “When one clicks ‘I agree’ to the terms on the box, does one usually know what one is
doing? Absolutely. There is no doubt whatsoever that one is objectively manifesting one’s assent to the
terms in the box, whether or not one has read them.” Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts,
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 635 (2002). Yet, the concept of manifested consent is much more attenuated
when applied to website visitors, where the act of “consent” is merely using the website.
108. See BÖHME & KÖPSELL, supra note 79.
109. Poetry Foundation, Privacy Policy/Terms of Use, http://www.poetryfoundation.org/
foundation/privacy.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).
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example, states:
Although we may attempt to notify you when major changes are made to
these Terms of Service, you should periodically review the most up-todate version http://www.youtube.com/t/terms). YouTube may, in its sole
discretion, modify or revise these Terms of Service and policies at any
time, and you agree to be bound by such modifications or revisions.
Nothing in these Terms of Service shall be deemed to confer any thirdparty rights or benefits. 110

Websites have the ability to make terms salient or hidden, and courts
should recognize their technological advantage in evaluating the
enforceability of contracts. Unlike negotiated contracts, the consumer
has no ability to refuse certain terms. This is not to say that take-it-orleave-it contracts should all be unenforceable. Rather, the website
should be charged with indicating whether in fact the contract is a takeit-or-leave-it contract. All terms should not be presumptively valid or
considered part of the bargain given the realities of online contracting.
As previously noted, online contract terms are onerous and numerous,
with no visible indication of the extent of terms. There is no additional
cost to the website of including burdensome terms, either with respect to
the economic costs of reproduction or loss of goodwill. Similarly, there
is no customer relations benefit to streamlining terms to one or two
pages. This contrasts with offline contracts, which may also be offered
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, but which signal the burdensome nature of
the contract with the large number of pages. Offline, many companies
seek to enhance the likelihood of enforceability by requiring their
customers to initial each page. These signals are missing with online
contracts. 111
The failure of consideration is even more pronounced with regard to
crook provisions. A website uses crook provisions to appropriate
benefits from the consumer without the consumer’s knowledge. For
example, customers who visit an online retailer submit their personal
information to allow the website to process their credit card,
communicate with the company about their purchases, and ship the
purchased items. Customers may not be aware that the website is also
110. YouTube, Terms of Service, http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last visited Mar. 21, 2010).
111. As Juliet Moringiello observes:
The assumption that a click serves all of the same purposes that a signature does is
also flawed. . . . While it is clear that an offeree need not read contract terms in order to
be bound by them, it is also clear that she must be given some signal that she is entering
into a legally binding transaction so that she knows to read the offered terms. A signature
provides that signal.
Moringiello, supra note 13, at 1331.
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installing cookies on the customers’ computers, selling and trading their
personal information, and tracking their online movements. 112 The
company thus receives an increase in the economic value of the
exchange without the consumer’s knowledge.
Courts have taken liberties with traditional doctrine to construct a
contract out of a unilaterally imposed set of terms. For example, the
“pay now, terms later” nature of shrinkwrap licenses, traditionally would
be analyzed as a request for modification. 113 Typically, consideration
must be furnished for the modification, unless the transaction fell within
the ambit of the UCC, which licenses do not (but then again, whether
these are truly licenses is another matter). 114 Yet, despite their “pay
now, terms later” nature, courts consider shrinkwraps to be enforceable
agreements, not attempted modifications. Mutual assent is often lacking
with all three types of ’wrap agreements, for how is assent possible
where most users are unaware that they are even entering into an
agreement? Courts have nonetheless found constructive assent and
constructive notice in order to enforce ’wrap contracts. 115
Bargaining power typically means several different things. 116 It can
refer to one party’s greater financial power over the other party. It can
112. See, e.g., Clicking for Gold: How Internet Companies Profit from Data on the Web,
ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 2010, at 9–11 (discussing how internet companies use customer tracking to
enhance their sales and marketing efforts); Stephanie Clifford, Your Online Clicks Have Value, for
Someone Who Has Something to Sell, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/03/26/business/media/26adco.html (reporting on the economic value of customer data from
website visitors).
113. For example, the district court that initially presided over ProCD v. Zeidenberg concluded
that under either § 2-207 or § 2-209 of the UCC, the terms of the shrinkwrap agreement were not
binding upon the purchaser because he never agreed to it expressly. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908
F. Supp. 640, 654–65 (W.D. Wis. 1996), rev’d, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Step-Saver Data
Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 98–99 (3rd Cir. 1991) (finding user agreement not binding under
UCC § 2-207); Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 766 (D. Ariz. 1993)
(finding license agreement not binding under either § 2-207 or § 2-209).
114. See ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 651–56 (discussing the applicability of the UCC to a shrinkwrap
license agreement); see also Epstein, supra note 67, at 100–02 (noting that if a transaction is
characterized as a sale, and not a license, the UCC applies, including the rules governing offer and
acceptance).
115. See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Adobe Sys., Inc. v. One
Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630,
638–39 (8th Cir. 2005).
116. Daniel Barnhizer notes that “[m]odern American courts have largely failed to infuse the
concept of inequality of bargaining power with legally coherent meaning.” See Daniel D. Barnhizer,
Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 199 (2005). He states that “many courts
address inequality of bargaining power in terms of the weaker party’s lack of meaningful alternatives,
necessity, the nature of the good or service, or inability to negotiate terms” as well as “potential factors
relating to characteristics of the parties and characteristics of the transaction” including “wealth,
business sophistication, education or knowledge, race, gender, ‘size’ of the parties, monopoly power,
and consumer status.” Id. at 199–200 (internal citations omitted).
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refer to one party’s greater leverage in the marketplace due to its size or
influence. It can mean education level or knowledge. 117 This Article
suggests another aspect of bargaining power which is especially relevant
in the online context. A party may have bargaining power due to the
technological advantage it has over the other party. Specifically,
websites have the capability to set-up how the contracting process will
proceed. They have the ability to highlight or hide terms. They can
require the customer to click numerous times or not at all. They can
scatter contractual terms over several web pages or locate all relevant
terms in a central location. Websites, in other words, make choices
about how to present contractual terms to the customer. The customer,
on the other hand, is unable to control the structure of the transaction or
the manner in which the terms are presented. The technical power to
create the form of the contract rests entirely with the website.
Furthermore, there is no realistic, practical way for the consumer to
communicate requested changes.
Some might argue that contracts of adhesion exist offline too, and that
courts have for decades enforced them. 118 Yet, as Juliet Moringiello
observed, there are “significant differences in popular perceptions of
paper and electronic communications.” 119 The number of pages serves a
signaling function. A thick document indicates more onerous terms and
greater obligations for the nondrafting party. Customers might not read
the fine print terms contained in a multi-page paper contract, but they
are at least aware of the multiple pages which indicate the potentially
burdensome nature of the transaction. 120 Consumers requesting a loan
from a bank likely expect a lengthy document, whereas consumers
wanting to buy a shirt will likely view with suspicion any contract that
they are asked to sign at the cash register. A business may lose
customers if it asks them to sign contracts before processing relatively
minor purchases. Online, however, there is no signaling of terms.
117. Id. at 200. Barnhizer notes that some courts adopt an “‘we-know-it-when-we-see-it’
approach.” Id. at 201. See also Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt and Benjamin C. Ellis, The Relative
Bargaining Power of Employers and Unions in the Global Information Age: A Comparative Analysis of
the United States and Japan, 20 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010) (noting that bargaining power
“has been defined as the ability to induce an opponent to accept an agreement on one’s own terms.”);
Paul F. Kirgis, The Contractarian Model of Arbitration and Its Implications for Judicial Review of
Arbitral Awards, 85 OR. L. REV. 1, 50 (2006) (using a definition of unequal bargaining power where
“one side has no meaningful opportunity to influence the terms of the agreement.”).
118. As Mark Lemley has noted, however, “[o]ffline, such agreements are not all that common, in
part because it is too much effort to get consumers to sign the standard forms.” Lemley, supra note 9, at
466.
119. Moringiello, supra note 13, at 1310.
120. By distinguishing offline and online adhesion contracts, this Article is not suggesting that
offline adhesion contracts should always be enforceable regardless of the substance of their terms.
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Accordingly, the correlation between the burdensome nature of the
contract terms and the importance of the transaction is often lost when
the transaction occurs online.
B. How Crook Provisions Alter the Bargain
Courts have accommodated business realities in approving
contracting innovations; yet, these contracting innovations have created
new realities that have weakened the legitimacy of contracts. 121 This
Article suggests that courts expressly recognize as a bargaining
advantage the technological ability that websites possess to select a
contracting form. In doing so, courts should re-conceptualize the
bargained-for-exchange when it takes place online. One click should
not suffice to indicate agreement to crook provisions that misconstrue
the nature of the bargain itself. As Fuller observed, the channeling
function of form is unnecessary where the transaction is already divided
into “definite, clear-cut business categories,” 122 but where “[t]he
ambiguity of the situation is . . . carefully cultivated and exploited” by
one party, “[s]ome ‘channeling’ . . . would be highly desirable.” 123
While much of the scholarly commentary surrounding ’wrap contracts
concerns the whittling away of mutual assent or the uncertainty of
establishing offer and acceptance, 124 the doctrine of consideration has
also been much compromised by online contracts. 125 Courts have
determined that assent to the online transaction, flexibly and creatively
construed, means consent to all its terms. Companies then, through
crook provisions, have included terms that often change the nature of the
bargained-for-exchange itself. In other words, companies exploited the
form of ’wrap contracts so that their contractual nature was unclear, and

121. Woodrow Hartzog notes that adherence to traditional contract doctrine “often ignores the
many ways relationships, representations and, ultimately, contracts are formed online.” Hartzog, supra
note 80 (manuscript at 43).
122. Fuller, supra note 87, at 806.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 9, at 464 (discussing the “death of assent”); Kunz et al., supra
note 55 (examining the rules governing implied assent); Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The
Rise of Modularity and the Waning of Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1231 (2006); Michael I.
Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1265–66 (1993) (proposing that courts consider how a “reasonable drafter”
might understand the customer’s assent).
125. See Moringiello, supra note 13, at 1332 (“Form plays as much as a cautionary role in the
contracting process as the signature does” which necessitates a consideration of “whether a person who
is presented with 13 pages of Internet text . . . perceives that text in the same way that she would
perceive 13 pages of printed matter.”). For an extended analysis of the consideration doctrine in the
online context, particularly regarding open source licenses, see Hillman & O’Rourke, supra note 92.
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they exploited it in a way that changed the bargain for the consumer.
To address this problem, online agreements containing crook
provisions should be bifurcated and considered as two separate bargains.
In the primary bargain, the website sets the terms. In the secondary
bargain, the consumer grants a license to the website via the crook
provisions, and the website promises to adhere to the scope of that
license. Companies should enable the consumer to express the scope of
the license through ’wrap agreements. More specifically, companies
should allow consumers to indicate with a click each benefit or right that
they grant to the website. While the author has elsewhere argued that
websites should require a click for each limitation or right taken away
(i.e. via a “sword” provision), this Article’s proposal is different because
it involves analyzing the problem of ’wrap agreements from the
standpoint of consideration and crook provisions, and not assent and
sword provisions. 126 As previously mentioned, existing case law makes
a requirement of actual assent difficult to justify. Furthermore, the line
dividing sword and shield provisions is often blurry. The line between
crook and shield provisions is more distinct. Thus, it would be easier to
both justify and administer a multiple clicking requirement to establish
consideration than it would be to establish assent.
Online transactions are precisely the type of contracting situation that
requires channeling. Fuller explained the significance of the channeling
function as follows:
Just as channeling may result unintentionally from formalities directed
toward other ends, so these other ends tend to be satisfied by any device
which accomplishes a channeling of expression. There is an evidentiary
value in the clarity and definiteness of contour which such a device
accomplishes. Anything which effects a neat division between the legal
and the non-legal, or between different kinds of legal transactions, will
tend also to make apparent to the party the consequences of his action and
will suggest deliberation where deliberation is needed. Indeed, we may
go further and say that some minimum satisfaction of the desideratum of
channeling is necessary before measures designed to prevent
inconsiderateness can be effective. 127

To require that the consumer click for each benefit or right granted by
the consumer to the website, rather than once to indicate agreement to
all benefits or rights contained in the agreement, creates a more accurate
bargain that may actually reflect the intent of the parties. Multiple
clicking forces awareness and indicates to consumers that they are
126. In a previous article, I argued that companies should require a “click” to indicate assent to
certain terms that limit rights. See Kim, supra note 7.
127. Fuller, supra note 87, at 803.
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granting rights/benefits via a crook provision.
Furthermore, a multiple clicking requirement may be more palatable
to judges who are more comfortable policing contracts on the basis of
form rather than content. 128 A multiple clicking format thus fulfills the
channeling function that the current “one click” blanket assent approach
fails to do.
1. Bargaining for Intellectual Property Rights
Consumers who visit websites that do not charge a fee, such as social
networking sites, understand that they make a bargain with the website.
In exchange for the services provided by the website, they contribute
“eyeballs,” increasing the website’s page views and thereby enhancing
its ability to attract advertisers. What they may not realize is that some
websites extract, via a crook provision, intellectual property rights that
belong to the consumer. In some cases, the services being provided to
the consumer are not worth the extraction of these rights.
Under copyright law, the author of a creative work owns the
copyright to that work. 129 The copyright owner, however, may license
or assign some or all of the rights to the work by agreement. 130 Because
’wrap agreements are recognized as legally enforceable contracting
forms even though consumers rarely read their terms, copyright owners
may license their rights to a work without even realizing it. For
example, on the classmates.com website, the terms of use state as
follows:
When you participate in the Classmates community you are granting
Classmates certain rights to use the Content you submit or post through
the Website. By submitting Content you grant us a royalty-free,
worldwide, non-terminable, non-exclusive license to use, reproduce,
modify, adapt, edit, market, publish, store, distribute, have distributed,
publicly and privately display, communicate, publicly and privately
perform, transmit, have transmitted, create derivative works based upon,
and promote such Content (in whole or in part) in any medium now
known or hereafter devised, for editorial, commercial, promotional and all
other purposes including, without limitation, the right to publish your
name in connection with your Content; and the right to sublicense any or
128. See Moringiello, supra note 13, at 1347 (“Courts are often reluctant to police the content of
standard forms but they regularly police form. In regulating the form of Internet contracts, judges must
consider the ways in which individuals perceive electronic communications.”).
129. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006).
130. Id. § 201(d). While some may wonder whether an author may contractually assign the
copyright to a work that has not yet been created, business norms and policy would likely compel
enforcement by the courts.
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all of these rights. You acknowledge that Classmates owns all right, title,
and interest in any compilation, collective work or other derivative work
created using or incorporating the Content. . . . No compensation will be
paid for the use of your Content, including, without limit, any photograph
you may provide. 131

In other words, by posting content on classmates.com, consumers grant
a “non-terminable” license to use that content, presumably even after
they have stopped using the website, requested the content be removed,
or both. Furthermore, the website can publicize the consumer’s name
with the content, and use any photograph that a consumer posts to the
site for any purpose, including marketing purposes. The website could,
for example, distribute content created by a consumer on a banner ad,
accompanied by a photograph of the consumer and his or her real name.
Many consumers are probably not aware of the provision and some
might forgo classmates.com’s services if they realized that this was the
price for using the services.
2. Bargaining for Consumer Information
A common type of crook provision involves the appropriation of
personal data by websites. A company may sell or trade a customer’s
personal information and track online activity by using cookies or tags.
It typically discloses these practices in its privacy policies. 132 The
collection of data by websites in accordance with a conspicuously
disclosed privacy policy is generally acknowledged to be legally
permissible. 133
131. Classmates.com, Terms of Service, http://www.classmates.com/cm/reg/terms#content (last
visited Mar. 22, 2011).
132. Some uncertainty exists regarding whether privacy policies are contracts enforceable against
the website. See, e.g., In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., No. Civ.-04-126(PAM/JSM), 2004 WL
1278459 (D. Minn. June 6, 2004) (finding that general statements regarding website’s privacy policy
were not contractual). When courts have considered whether website privacy policies are contracts, they
have done so by asking whether the terms are enforceable promises by the website to protect consumer
privacy, and not whether the terms are enforceable promises by the consumer. See In re Jetblue
Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig.,
2004 WL 1278459. Unfortunately, a finding that privacy policies are self-imposed contractual
obligations by the website may create perverse incentives whereby websites use them to reduce or
terminate obligations to protect privacy. Rather than enhancing consumer privacy, websites may
provide more disclosures and caveats that merely protect them and offer nothing to the consumer.
133. In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299; In re Nw. Airlines Privacy
Litig., 2004 WL 1278459. See also Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Contractual Nature of Online
Policies Remains Unsettled, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 10, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/
PubArticleNY.jsp?hubtype=practiceMore&id=1202464402856&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1; Allyson W.
Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control Over Personal Information?, 111 PENN.
ST. L. REV. 587, 588 (2007) (“[I]f the website complies with its own promises, there is little else to
prevent the site from doing with the information whatever it wants . . . besides the website company’s
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It is unclear what legal right or interest, if any, consumers have in
their personal information. Some scholars argue that consumers should
have a property interest in personal information. 134 Others view the
interest that consumers should have as a privacy interest. 135 Both
characterizations, while suitable in some contexts, are inappropriate in
others. Some personal information may reflect or be subsumed by a
privacy interest, but other personal information is public and should not
be protectable by either a property or privacy claim. A company, for
example, may include addresses and phone numbers of residences in a
directory without getting approval from the homeowners. In many
cases, a consumer’s privacy interest depends upon the context, including
how the personal information is being used. 136 While it may be helpful
to discuss the use of personal information in certain contexts as being a
property or privacy interest, to do so when discussing the use of personal
information more generally and in the abstract often proves unhelpful or
misguided. In discussing a particular problematic use of information or
type of information, referring to one or both of these categories
(information as property or information as privacy) may be relevant and
appropriate. Neither the concept of property nor that of privacy,
however, captures all uses of all types of personal information.
Consequently, when discussing the wide range of uses of consumer
information generally, it may be less helpful to think of the type of
information or even the type of use than the method by which the
information is obtained.
This Article proposes thinking about a consumer’s legal interest in
personal information as a proprietary interest. To describe the
own interest in attracting and maintaining customers.”).
134. For a discussion of the issues and problems associated with recognizing information privacy
as property, see Vera Bergelson, It’s Personal But Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in Personal
Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379 (2003); Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information
Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (2000); Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1125 (2000). But see Mark A. Lemley, Private Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1545, 1547
(2000) (finding the creation of an intellectual property right in individual data to be “a very bad idea.”).
See also In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., 2004 WL 1278459 (finding that information voluntarily
provided by plaintiffs belonged to website and that disclosure of such information would not be highly
offensive to a reasonable person).
135. See Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000) (arguing that meaningful autonomy requires a degree of freedom from
monitoring by others); Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort
Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63 (2003) (advocating a privacy tort based
response to unauthorized consumer data profiling).
136. As Jacqueline Lipton notes “information cannot be property in the same sense that land and
other tangible items can be property” Accordingly, there will be significant differences between rights
in information and rights in tangible property. Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and
Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV. 135, 140–41 (2004).
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consumer’s interest in personal information as a proprietary interest
captures two very important insights. First, it describes the consumer’s
interest in personal information because the term “proprietary” captures
both property and privacy interests without necessarily embodying one
or the other. The term proprietary is therefore a better generic term
when discussing personal information more generally. Specific types of
personal information then may be subcategorized as involving privacy
or property interests. Second, the term proprietary reflects the method
by which information is captured. Personal information is obtained
through the online version of a bargained-for-exchange. Consumers
may not own all personal information in a property sense; however, they
do not have to relinquish such information either. A consumer filling
out a website form with personal information does so in order for the
website to process credit card information and deliver the ordered items.
The consumer does not fill out the information with the intent of
assisting the website in its future marketing and sales efforts. In some
cases, consumers may have declined the website’s services if they were
aware of how it uses their personal information. 137 For example, after
discovering that she was being tracked by cookies 138 she thought she
had erased, one woman said, “Instead of going to Amazon, I’m going to
the local bookstore.” 139 She added, “My information is now being
bartered like a product without my knowledge or understanding.” 140 A
website’s use of consumer personal information may be more than
annoying—it might expose consumers to a greater risk of identity
theft. 141 The consumer’s interest is proprietary because the personal
137. For example, users of the website Reunion.com were asked to provide their e-mail addresses
and passwords; they did not realize that the site would then send solicitations to all of their e-mail
contacts. Wendy N. Davis, Spam—A Lot: Networking Sites Spur Another Look at Bogus E-mails,
A.B.A. J., Mar. 2010, at 17.
138. Some plaintiffs have argued that the use of cookies and other tracking devices may constitute
“electronic surveillance” and thus, violate the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510 et. seq. and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030. See, e.g., Class Action
Complaint, Weindorf v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (Nos. 00
CIV. 4871(AKH), 00 CIV. 6219(AKH), 00 CIV. 6249(AKH)), 2000 WL 35600895. The applicability
of these acts to online tracking is an important issue but is beyond the scope of this article.
139. Tanzine Vega, Code That Tracks Users’ Browsing Prompts Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,
2010, at B3.
140. Id.
141. Haynes, supra note 133, at 592 (noting that unwitting disclosures may “result in identity
theft, as well as contribute to the less pernicious, but thoroughly irritating and often expensive, increase
in spam”). As Dan Barnhizer notes, “Before the information era, producers did generate consumer
profiles based upon information gleaned from their interactions with those consumers. But the
informational inputs for those models were incomplete compared to what can be gathered and processed
today, and much of the data lacked the fluidity that characterizes today’s models.” Daniel D. Barnhizer,
Propertization Metaphors for Bargaining Power and Control of the Self in the Information Age, 54
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 69, at 90 (2006) (citation omitted).
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information is about the consumer, but it is also obtained via a
bargained-for-exchange and thus creates a contractual interest which
belongs to the consumer.
The submission of information by consumers should be viewed as a
license by them to the website to use that information. What consumers
do not indicate, because the contracting form does not allow them, is the
scope of the license to use the information. The practical problem, of
course, is that the licensee/company, not the licensor/consumer, drafts
the scope of the license. Not surprisingly, websites grant themselves a
very broad license to use the information. 142 Companies take advantage
of their technological power over the contracting form to incorporate
crook provisions to increase the value of their bargained-for-exchange—
without having to bargain for it.
For example, on the gap.com website, located under “Terms of Use”
is the following:
Your submission of personal information through the Sites is governed by
our privacy policy, which can be reached by clicking on the “Privacy
Policy” link located in the footer section of the Sites (the “Privacy
Policy”). This Agreement incorporates by reference the terms and
conditions of the Privacy Policy. 143

The customer must then return to the home page and then click on the
“Privacy Policy” hyperlink nestled at the bottom of the page. The
privacy policy is several pages long and states that Gap can use the
personal information in a variety of ways:
When you provide personal information to one of our Gap Inc. brands
(Gap, BananaRepublic, Old Navy, Gap Outlet, Banana Republic Factory
Store, Piperlime, or Athleta), we may share that information with our
other Gap Inc. brands.
. . . If you purchase Athleta brand products through our website or by
placing a catalog order by phone or mail, we may share your name, postal
address, and shopping history with like-minded organizations whose
privacy policies meet the Direct Marketing Association’s privacy
standards, for their direct mail marketing purposes. We do not share
email addresses for such purposes. 144

142. Id. at 609 (In none of the actions involving privacy policies “did the privacy policy provide
any protection to the consumers that they would not have had absent the policy. And in a few cases, the
policy actually gave the website company greater leeway to use personal information, because the
statute at issue had an exception for consent or authorization by a party to the communication.”).
143. Gap.com, Terms of Use, http://www.gap.com/customerService/info.do?cid=6754&mlink=
5058,1901277,13&clink=1901277 (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
144. Gap.com, Privacy Policy, http://www.gap.com/customerService/info.do?cid=2331&mlink=
5058,1901277,14&clink=1901277 (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss4/2

32

Kim: CONTRACT’S ADAPTATION AND THE ONLINE BARGAIN
F-KIM2

9/4/2011 1:15:03 PM

2011]CONTRACT’S ADAPTATION & THE ONLINE BARGAIN 1359
The Privacy Policy also states that it may track the consumer’s
movements on the websites:
We use “pixel tags” (also called “web beacons” or “clear gifs”), which
are tiny graphic images, on our websites and in our emails. Pixel tags
help us analyze our customers’ online behavior and measure the
effectiveness of our websites and our advertising. We work with service
providers that help us track, collect, and analyze this information.
Pixel tags on our sites may be used to collect information about your
visit, including the pages you view, the features you use, the links you
click, and other actions you take in connection with the sites. This
information may include your computer’s Internet protocol (IP) address,
your browser type, your operating system, date and time information, and
other technical information about your computer. We may also track
certain information about the identity of the website you visited
immediately before coming to our site. We do not otherwise track any
information about your use of other websites.
Pixel tags and cookies in our emails may be used to track your
interactions with those messages, such as when you receive, open, or
click a link in an email message from us.
We also work with third-party companies that use tracking
technologies to serve advertisements on our behalf across the Internet.
These companies may collect information about your visits to our
websites and your interaction with our advertising and other
communications. If you would like more information about this practice
and to know your choices about not having your information used by
these companies, please visit http://www.networkadvertising.org/
managing/opt_out.asp.
We may combine the information we collect through cookies and pixel
tags with other information we have collected from you. This
information may be used to improve our websites, to personalize your
online experience, to tailor our communications with you, to determine
the effectiveness of our advertising, and for other internal business
purposes. 145

The crook provisions grant the retailer the right to receive unbargainedfor benefits which have measurable economic value.
A website may also employ a clickwrap that incorporates by reference
the terms of its privacy policy that is only accessible via a hyperlink.
For example, on wellsfargo.com, a customer must click to agree to the
terms of the online access agreement in order to access the website. 146
In the seventeenth paragraph of the thirty-three page, single-spaced,

145. Id.
146. Wells Fargo, Online Access Agreement, https://online.wellsfargo.com/common/html/
wibdisc.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
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eight-point font document, the agreement states: “All information
gathered from you in connection with using the Service will be governed
by the provisions of the Wells Fargo Privacy Policy, including the
Online Privacy Policy.” 147 The user must then review the terms of both
privacy policies in order to determine what Wells Fargo may do with
customer information. 148
One might argue that the privacy provisions are part of the bargain
between the website and the consumer, but such an argument defies both
reality and common sense given that most consumers fail to read privacy
policies and often mistakenly believe that laws protect use of their
personal information. For example, a recent study found that 62% of
surveyed Americans mistakenly believe that if a website has a privacy
policy, it means that the site cannot share information with other
companies without permission, and 54% mistakenly believe that a
privacy policy requires a website to delete a consumer’s information
upon request. 149 Furthermore, 46% of respondents mistakenly believe
that if a website has a privacy policy, “it means that you have the right to
sue the website for violating it.” 150
It is doubtful that most websites would rather walk away from the
transaction than give up the benefits granted in a crook provision.
Retailing websites such as the gap.com are in the business of selling
consumers clothing. The benefit they receive from collecting consumer
information is additional or ancillary to the payment they receive for
their goods. One might argue that the benefits companies accrue from
the collection of consumer data get passed to the consumer in the form
of lower prices. Even if this were so, 151 my proposal does not prohibit
lower or variable pricing in exchange for collecting personal
information. Rather, it establishes a mechanism by which to determine
whether the collection of personal data is in fact part of the primary
transaction or whether it is an ancillary or “free rider” benefit. I am
skeptical that a retailer (as opposed to a social networking site) would
decline to sell products to a consumer who chose not to permit tracking

147. Id.
148. Wells Fargo, Privacy Policy for Wells Fargo and Wachovia Companies,
https://www.wellsfargo.com/privacy_security/privacy/individuals (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
149. See JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., CONTRARY TO WHAT MARKETERS SAY, AMERICANS REJECT
TAILORED ADVERTISING 21 (2009), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/
20090929-Tailored_Advertising.pdf.
150. Id.
151. As William Woodward has remarked in the context of choice of law and choice of forum
clauses in contracts, whether savings from using contracts of adhesion are indeed passed along to
consumers depends upon many business factors. William J. Woodward, Jr., Finding the Contract in
Contracts for Law, Forum and Arbitration, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 17 (2006).
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or the sale of personal information. In the offline world, some
consumers routinely decline to provide retailers with a requested phone
number or e-mail address for their marketing purposes; however, when
this happens, retailers typically do not forego the sale and refuse to
complete the transaction. 152 Even those websites that do not charge for
their services, such as social networking sites, might prefer to limit or
restrict their use of consumer data rather than lose a potential user.
Given the complexities of online tracking and the difficulties of
online disclosure, this Article proposes that if a website intends to
include behavioral tracking or the sale of member data to third parties as
part of its bargain, it should do so expressly in its technical design. That
a company might have been able to obtain a customer’s personal
information elsewhere is irrelevant because the basis of the proprietary
interest is in contract, not property or privacy. In other words, a
company might have obtained the information elsewhere but did not.
The company obtained it from the customer who gave the information
for specific purposes, as part of a bargained-for-exchange.
3. Clicks as Online Bargaining
A browsewrap may be an acceptable contract form when used to
shield a website from liability for an offered product or service. It is a
stretch, however, to claim that there is a contract at all when a website
uses a browsewrap as a crook to exploit a customer’s personal
information relinquished for one purpose (e.g. the purchase of a product)
but used for additional purposes (e.g. to improve the website’s
marketing efforts). The crook provisions do not pertain to or directly
affect the product or service being offered. They are essentially free
rider provisions in that they are furtively included in browsewrap
agreements simply because the website can do so without the
consumer’s knowledge. Thus, unlike sword or shield provisions, crook
provisions are not economically efficient. They give too much to the
website and take away too much from the consumer. 153
There is an implied bargain between the consumer and the website,
although what is being bargained for is uncertain. The consumer inputs
152. Furthermore, the California Supreme Court recently held that a zip code was personal
identification information and, therefore, retailers could not request it for marketing purposes from
customers making credit card purchases because such conduct violated a California statute. Pineda v.
Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., 246 P.3d 612, 614 (Cal. 2011).
153. Data may be the most valuable asset on the web and the least recognized by consumers as
having value. See Clicking for Gold: How Internet Companies Profit from Data on the Web,
ECONOMIST, Feb. 27–Mar. 5, 2010, at 9 (The “biggest websites have long recognized that information
itself is their biggest treasure.”).
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personal information in order to receive advertised goods or services; the
website offers and agrees to sell the goods through the advertised
process in exchange for payment. The website intends to use the
information to process credit cards and deliver goods, but also for
marketing and sales purposes. What is unclear, then, is whether the
website would offer the goods at the same price if it were unable to
reuse consumer information for purposes that are not necessary to order
fulfillment.
Even those websites, such as social networking sites, that do not
charge money for their services implicitly bargain for the provision of
their services. Facebook, for example, allows its members to use its site
and share content in exchange for the ability to advertise to them and to
their friends, and thereby generate revenue. Miguel Helft, a reporter for
the New York Times, wrote:
When you sign up for Facebook, you enter into a bargain. You share
personal information with the site, and Facebook agrees to obey your
wishes when it comes to who can see what you post.
At the same time, you agree that Facebook can use that data to decide
what ads to show you. 154

Prior to the proliferation of present-day intrusive and extensive tracking
technology, the bargained-for-exchange on non-retail websites was
much more transparent— eyeballs for services or information. A user
visited a website in order to obtain information or to take advantage of
the website’s services; in exchange, the user presented an advertising
opportunity and increased the website’s page views. The more page
views a website had, the more value it had to advertisers and the more it
could charge for advertising space. But in the past few years,
sophisticated technology that is invisible to the average website visitor
has complicated this straightforward exchange. Helft noted that the
bargain with Facebook “is a complicated deal that many people enter
into without perhaps fully understanding what will happen to their
information.” 155
The problem of course is that while the website can and does specify
the scope of the license that it offers to the customer by stating what the
customer can and cannot do on the website, the scope of the license
granted by the customer to the use of the customer’s personal
information or content is determined by the website. Consequently,
consumers are usually unaware of the myriad provisions to which they

154. Miguel Helft, Facebook Vows to Fix a Flaw in Data Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2010, at
B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/technology/19facebook.html.
155. Id.
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have “agreed” with a single click or simply by browsing a website.
Where the provisions serve shield or sword functions, the consumer’s
actual assent to the provisions may be irrelevant from an efficiency
standpoint 156 because the website would not have entered into the
bargain without those liability-limiting provisions, and the consumer
likely would have accepted the provisions given their limited purpose
and standard nature. 157 But this is not necessarily true where the
contract acts as a crook, i.e. where it requires the consumer to
unknowingly grant the website certain benefits ancillary to the primary
transaction. Therefore, online contracting must provide a way for the
consumer to indicate whether it will continue with the transaction after
being notified about the crook provision and for the website to indicate
how important the crook provisions are to the transaction. 158
One way for a website to permit a customer to express bargaining is
by forcing the customer to click to indicate the scope of license. A click
“costs” a website both in terms of customer goodwill and the increase in
likelihood that it will lose a sale with each transactional hurdle. By
requiring a click for each requested use of customer information, a
website indicates whether it in fact wants the use of the information or
whether it has included it simply as a free rider.
Opponents may object to this proposal because it burdens consumers
by requiring them to click numerous times. That is exactly the point.
The website should bargain for each use rather than assume it is
comprehensively granted after a single click. Consumers are otherwise
unable to indicate the scope of the license to use personal information or
content. A website has the power to enable consumers to indicate the
scope of the license that they are granting. Thus, the website should
exercise this power by structuring their online agreements to require
consumers to click after each permitted use. For example, in the
gap.com agreement previously introduced, consumers would indicate
156. Sword and shield provisions may still be unenforceable on grounds of equity or for lack of
notice.
157. In discussing Easterbrook’s reasoning in ProCD v. Zeidenberg, Richard Epstein notes that
there were “two important facts” about the case that were especially relevant: “First, the disputed
provision is perfectly standard and does not in fact vary from one transaction to another. Second, there
are no recorded instances in which any potential software purchaser has been ever able to obtain a
waiver of any of the restrictions found in these agreements, including the use limitation at issue in
ProCD.” Epstein, supra note 67, at 104. He further notes that Easterbrook’s “functional view of the law
of contract is that it allows bargains by which both parties are able to improve their economic position.”
Id.
158. See also Samuelson, supra note 134, at 1158 (If “software and Internet companies have
devised licenses to cover virtually every Internet transaction between them and their companies, it may
seem only fair for the customers to start insisting on contractual terms that serve their interests as
well.”). Samuelson proposes default licensing rules based on trade secrecy laws. Id. at 1151–67.
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their scope of license as follows:
Your submission of personal information through the Sites is governed
by our privacy policy, which can be reached by clicking on the “Privacy
Policy” link located in the footer section of the Sites (the “Privacy
Policy”). This Agreement incorporates by reference the terms and
conditions of the Privacy Policy.
When you provide personal information to one of our Gap Inc. brands
(Gap, Banana Republic, Old Navy, Gap Outlet, Banana Republic Factory
Store, Piperlime, or Athleta), we may share that information with our
other Gap Inc. brands. [AGREE] [DISAGREE] If you purchase Athleta
brand products through our website or by placing a catalog order by
phone or mail, we may share your name, postal address, and shopping
history with like-minded organizations whose privacy policies meet the
Direct Marketing Association’s privacy standards, for their direct mail
marketing purposes. [AGREE] [DISAGREE] We do not share email
addresses for such purposes. . . .
We use “pixel tags” (also called “web beacons” or “clear gifs”), which
are tiny graphic images, on our websites and in our emails. Pixel tags
help us analyze our customers’ online behavior and measure the
effectiveness of our websites and our advertising. We work with service
providers that help us track, collect, and analyze this information.
Pixel tags on our sites may be used to collect information about your
visit, including the pages you view, the features you use, the links you
click, and other actions you take in connection with the sites. [AGREE]
[DISAGREE] This information may include your computer’s Internet
protocol (IP) address, your browser type, your operating system, date and
time information, and other technical information about your computer.
We may also track certain information about the identity of the website
you visited immediately before coming to our site.
[AGREE]
[DISAGREE] We do not otherwise track any information about your use
of other websites.
Pixel tags and cookies in our emails may be used to track your
interactions with those messages, such as when you receive, open, or
click a link in an email message from us. [AGREE] [DISAGREE]
We also work with third-party companies that use tracking
technologies to serve advertisements on our behalf across the Internet.
These companies may collect information about your visits to our
websites and your interaction with our advertising and other
communications. [AGREE] [DISAGREE] If you would like more
information about this practice and to know your choices about not
having your information used by these companies, please visit
http://www.networkadvertising.org/managing/opt_out.asp.
We may combine the information we collect through cookies and pixel
tags with other information we have collected from you. [AGREE]
[DISAGREE] This information may be used to improve our websites, to
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personalize your online experience, to tailor our communications with
you, to determine the effectiveness of our advertising, and for other
internal business purposes.

Similarly, in the classmates.com agreement, consumers would
indicate the scope of the license by clicking after each right granted as
follows:
When you participate in the Classmates community you are granting
Classmates certain rights to use the Content you submit or post through
the Website. By submitting Content you grant us a royalty-free
[AGREE] [DISAGREE], worldwide [AGREE] [DISAGREE], nonterminable [AGREE] [DISAGREE], non-exclusive [AGREE]
[DISAGREE] license to use [AGREE] [DISAGREE], reproduce
[AGREE] [DISAGREE], modify [AGREE] [DISAGREE], adapt
[AGREE] [DISAGREE], edit [AGREE] [DISAGREE], market [AGREE]
[DISAGREE], publish [AGREE] [DISAGREE], store [AGREE]
[DISAGREE], distribute [AGREE] [DISAGREE], have distributed
[AGREE] [DISAGREE], publicly [AGREE] [DISAGREE] and privately
display [AGREE] [DISAGREE], communicate [AGREE] [DISAGREE],
publicly [AGREE] [DISAGREE] and privately perform [AGREE]
[DISAGREE], transmit [AGREE] [DISAGREE], have transmitted
[AGREE] [DISAGREE], create derivative works based upon [AGREE]
[DISAGREE], and promote [AGREE] [DISAGREE] such Content (in
whole or in part) [AGREE] [DISAGREE] in any medium now known or
hereafter devised [AGREE] [DISAGREE], for editorial [AGREE]
[DISAGREE], commercial [AGREE] [DISAGREE], promotional
[AGREE] [DISAGREE] and all other purposes [AGREE] [DISAGREE]
including, without limitation, the right to publish your name in
connection with your Content [AGREE] [DISAGREE]; and the right to
sublicense any or all of these rights [AGREE] [DISAGREE]. You
acknowledge that Classmates owns all right, title, and interest in any
compilation, collective work or other derivative work created using or
incorporating the Content.
[AGREE] [DISAGREE] . . . No
compensation will be paid for the use of your Content, including, without
limit, any photograph you may provide.

The number of clicks thus corresponds to the scope of the license and
better reflects an actual bargained-for-exchange. The more uses the
website desires, the more clicks it must extract from the consumer. To
clarify, a social networking or similar website has an implied limited
license to post user-generated content which would not require any
clicking. The excessive clicking scenario would apply only in those
instances where the website seeks to use consumer generated content for
purposes other than to provide the services. Multiple clicking strikes a
compromise between blanket assent and contract invalidity.
It
necessarily includes an implied promise by the company not to exceed
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the scope of the license constructed—through clicking—by the
consumer. Consumers could seek restitution or damages, depending
upon the claim, against companies that exceed the scope of the license
granted by the consumer. 159
Currently customers are lulled into contracts online. The channeling
function of consideration has been cast aside. Without realizing it,
visitors to a website may have engaged in a contractual relationship. An
obtrusive requisite click changes the painlessness of contracting by
forcing a formality on what would otherwise seem to be a casual, nonlegal encounter. It thus satisfies the function of legal formalities. First,
it serves a channeling function. It may be unclear, for example, whether
notice of a hyperlink counts as notice of the terms on another page. A
click, however, clearly indicates the status of a particular use. Multiple
clicking would serve a cautionary function in that consumers would be
forced to think about what they are doing. They could no longer ignore
terms that reveal extensive tracking and selling of data. Companies
would be forced to think twice before stuffing their online agreements
with unnecessary terms just because they have thus far been able to get
away with doing so. Consequently, they might tailor their terms to
reflect a true bargained-for-exchange.
Retailing websites may have to reconsider whether they want to risk
losing sales in order to get additional uses from information that was
given by a customer to fulfill an order. Some might argue that part of
the bargained-for-exchange for a retail website is the ability to use
personal information for marketing or advertising purposes. For
example, a retail website intends to use the information to process credit
cards and deliver goods but also for marketing and advertising purposes.
In that case, the website can structure the bargain to reflect its intent. It
can provide incentives, such as bonuses or discounts, to consumers who
permit online tracking to offset the burden of multiple clicking. It can
refuse to sell goods to consumers who do not relinquish their personal
information for marketing purposes (although that is unlikely).
On the other hand, non-retail websites that provide content free of
charge may continue to insist upon intrusive tracking, but consumers are
then made aware of the extent of that tracking. Other websites may
decide to charge subscription fees in lieu of tracking and selling of
customer information. Still others may expressly pay consumers for the
use of their data. 160 Multiple clicking in essence imposes a tax on uses
159. Additionally, a website’s use of consumer information beyond the scope of the license
granted by the consumer may be relevant in consumer protection enforcement and similar proceedings.
160. Julia Angwin & Emily Steel, Web’s Hot New Commodity: Privacy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28,
2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487035290045761607640379202
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of information unrelated to the primary transaction. To impose a
technological burden forces the retailer to consider whether the risk of
losing a user is worth the potential uses of personal information or user
generated content. Unlike the terms of a standard form contract, which
are rarely read and thus impose little or no good will cost, customers are
likely to be annoyed by having to click multiple times in order to grant a
license to multiple uses of information or content. Accordingly, in order
to maintain and enhance customer relations, it is likely that companies
will retreat from their current acquisitive stance and compete on the
quality of their website experience, including their contracting
process. 161 Consumers then may actually shop for terms if the terms
impede their online experience the way that multiple clicking surely
will.
Multiple clicking is not the only way for websites to indicate online
bargaining. Websites, wishing to avoid multiple clicking, may have an
incentive to build alternative bargaining features into the technical
design of their sites. 162 They may, for example, have customers fill out
a license form that expressly permits specified uses of information
which the website can retain in their files. In order to be enforceable,
however, the license form must be typed out by the consumer. When
the customer revisits the website, a notice could remind customers of
their choices and provide them with the option of altering or retaining
those choices. Margaret Jane Radin has suggested “new possibilities for
individualization” with online contracts: “For a large proportion of
consumer transactions in the past, individual negotiation was not costeffective. That situation is changing. It is (or will soon be) technically
feasible for a website to offer a menu of contractual terms, each with its
price.” 163
Unfortunately, companies currently have no incentive to create
variable pricing schemes or to reconfigure their website designs to create
more efficient bargaining scenarios. A requirement that companies
enable customers to indicate online bargaining through clicking or other
74.html?mod=djemalertTECH (noting that some companies are pushing privacy as a “product” and
noting that, as awareness of the value of data grows, “some are seeking to protect it, and sometimes sell
it”).
161. See also Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 57, at 1011 (“For the great majority of internet
retailers, the ease of the shopping experience is more important than concerns about possible future
liability. . . . Thus, few retailers . . . use contracting interfaces sufficiently robust to make it reasonable
to expect that their contracts are enforceable against their customers.”).
162. Alternatively, if websites wish to avoid multiple clicking designs, they may simply limit their
use of customer information.
163. Radin, supra note 13, at 1150–51. Radin notes, however, that there may be various policy
problems that arise with such contract customization since the “opportunity to purchase better terms may
seem to exacerbate distinctions between haves and have-nots.” Id. at 1151.
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means may thus spur innovation that is beneficial to consumers.
V. CONCLUSION
In The Death of Contract, Grant Gilmore rather dramatically
pronounced that the “[c]ontract is dead,” 164 by which he meant that
contract rules were dissolving and that contract was being reabsorbed
into tort. 165 The proliferation of ’wrap contracts might lead one to think
that Gilmore could not have been more wrong. It is contract that seems
to be overwhelming tort. Through the use of browsewraps and
clickwraps, companies seem to be trying to manage their potential
liability under tort law through shield and sword contractual provisions.
Yet, the contracting of everything may still accomplish what Gilmore
predicted as the future impuissance of contracts. The very ubiquity of
contracts diminishes their potential usefulness; when contracts mean
anything and everything, contracts mean nothing. 166 They become an
illusion, a farce, another example of how the law is divorced from
reality. Consumers become conditioned to signing without reading.
Then, the enforceability of contracts is not determined by the terms in a
document, but by the boundaries of tort, property, and what a just
society can stomach. 167 Then the law and policymakers are forced to
step in. 168 Lawrence Friedman wrote:
The most dramatic changes touching the significance of contract law in
modern life also came about, not through internal developments in
contract law, but through developments in public policy which
systematically robbed contracts of its subject-matter. . . . The growth of
these specialized bodies of public policy removed from “contract” (in the
sense of abstract relationships) transactions and situations formerly
164. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 112 (1974).
165. Id. at 95.
166. See also Zev J. Eigen, The Devil in the Details: The Interrelationship Among Citizenship,
Rule of Law and Form-Adhesive Contracts, 41 CONN. L. REV. 381, 397 (2008) (speculating that “the
more we enter into form-adhesive agreements, the more our collective notion of contract become
watered-down.”).
167. As of the writing of this Article, a recent case involving a EULA highlights this point. Eric
Felten, Video Game Tort: You Made Me Play You, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052748703369704575461822847587104.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEFTTopOpini
on. In that case, a gamer is suing a gaming company for gross negligence for failing to warn users of the
addictive qualities of its product. A judge in Hawai’i has permitted the suit to continue, in a challenge to
the enforceability of the EULA, which limits the liability of the gaming company.
168. This may be even more true if standard form contracts are regarded differently by consumers
of different socio-economic status. Zev J. Eigen, for example, argues that “observed differences of
interpretations and experiences with boilerplate vary with socio-economic status [SES], such that high
SES actors view the enforceability of contracts they have signed as more malleable than lower SES
actors.” Eigen, supra note 166, at 387.
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governed by it. 169

The law of contracts is then pushed aside by these subcategories such
as labor law or insurance law and made a residual category, which
governs only that which is “left over after all the ‘specialized’ bodies of
law have been added up.” 170 It is the failure of contracts—of too much
fine print and too many non-negotiable terms in home loan and credit
card form contracts—that resulted in the Great Recession and more
consumer financial regulation. 171 Drafting parties are not immune from
contract’s failures. Mortgage servicing units, for example, allegedly
failed to read foreclosure documents before signing them. 172 Their
failure to read only exacerbated the housing crisis and exposed them to
lawsuits from investors. 173
The contracting of everything has
conditioned society not to take seriously the contracting of anything.
This Article attempts to give meaning back to contracts. It might
seem surprising that in a discussion of contract’s adaptation, this Article
has not compared contracts to animals—e.g., “contracts are like polar
bears that have evolved with very large feet to help them distribute their
weight more evenly on ice,” or “contracts are like camels, and need to
develop an online hump to survive.” But the adaptation of contracts is
not like that of animals. Animals are living, breathing creatures;
contracts are not. The evolution of living creatures originates from a
naturally occurring genetic variation; contracts, on the other hand, are
instruments of our creation. Just as common law lawyers in the
nineteenth century transformed the “clumsy institution” of contract to
respond to the needs of a developing free enterprise system, 174 if
contract law is to remain vital in our society and to our interactions with
each other, we must make it responsive to the needs of our increasingly
digital and globalized environment. 175
169. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CASE
STUDY 24 (1965).
170. Id. at 8. But see FARNSWORTH, at 35 (In many instances, “the general rules of contract law
have been successfully accommodated to the peculiarities of particular transactions, thus avoiding
fragmentation into separate branches of law.”).
171. Congress recently enacted the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act
of 2009. This was not the first time legislators stepped in to curb the contracting abuses of credit card
companies. In the 1970s, state governments enacted special legislation to regulate the substantive
content of credit card contracts and impose disclosure requirements in response to consumer concerns.
See Jeffrey Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: An Empirical Look
at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REV. 841 (1977).
172. Robbie Whelan & Ruth Simon, States to Probe Mortgage Mess, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 12, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704518104575546512922974100.html.
173. Id.
174. Kessler, supra note 22, at 629.
175. Llewelyn warned that
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Judicial accommodation of a changing business environment should
be applauded; however, it should not operate in a one-sided manner,
solely in favor of businesses. A website has the ability to enable both
parties to express their intent, and in order for a contract to mean
anything, it must reflect the intent of both parties. This Article explains
how one aspect of contract doctrine, the doctrine of consideration, can
be reconceptualized to better reflect the intent of the parties in the online
contracting environment. Courts recognized that mass production of
consumer goods required some adjustments to traditional contract
doctrines. 176 They should also recognize the practical effects of these
adjustments upon consumers. A more even allocation of the burdens of
modern day contracting between businesses and consumers may help
restore the legitimacy of contracts.

no legal chaos could readily rival that of an uncritical continuance of purely traditional
Contract doctrine into any era of transition which had not yet become non-contract and
had not yet built into clarity its own ways and doctrine. . . . Surely such a body of
doctrine vitally needs such critical restudy.
Llewelyn, supra note 83, at 782.
176. See supra Part III.
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